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I. Introduction
Over the last decade, resilience has become increasingly central to international and domestic urban policy-making. Climate change, recessions, over-population, or migration flows resulting from systemic environmental, economic, or social crises have affected the evolution of the urban quality of life. These short-and long-term stresses, collapses and changes have brought highly substantial changes in the sustainability of urban systems. In particular, a city's resilience lies in its capacity to adapt and transform itself to meet the needs and aspiration of its citizens, rather than in its ability to return to its pre-crisis form. Hence, there is a need to modify urban planning policies towards generating new strategies that transform the city through resilient processes.
However, prior to managing resilience, urban planners ought to understand urban cycles of change and the vulnerabilities and windows of opportunity these cycles of change introduce. This is the main objective of this paper.
To do so, we analyze two recurring cycles of urban change (from 1953 to 1979, and thereafter) in the city of Barcelona (Spain) using Holling's (1986) adaptive cycle theory. As illustrated in Figure 1 , this theory examines the dynamics and resilience of ecological and social-ecological systems using a four-phase adaptive cycle, which can be divided in two distinct loops: the front-loop includes "exploitation" or growth (the r phase) and "conservation" or consolidation (the K phase), and the back-loop includes "collapse" or release (the Ω phase), and "innovation" or reorganization (the α phase).
Fig. 1: Holling's Adaptive Cycle
Source: Adapted from Holling (1986) In the case study of Barcelona, we observe two complementary loops in the two recurring cycles of urban change analyzed (before and after 1979) . During the frontloop, financial and natural resources are efficiently exploited by homogenous dominant groups (private developers, the bourgeoisie, politicians or technocrats) with the objective to promote capital accumulation based on private (or private-public partnership) investments. In contrast, the back-loop emerges from Barcelona's heterogeneous urban social movements (neighborhood associations, activists, squatters, cooperatives and NGOs), whose objectives are diverse but converge in their discontent with the status-quo of conservation (the K phase) and their desire for a "common good" that includes social justice, social cohesion, participatory governance, and wellbeing for all.
Through our analysis, we identify the key role of the local-community initiatives in the resilient development of the city of Barcelona, and bring to light the relevance of the intra-and cross-scales between the city's institutional networks and its key actors in achieving sustainable development. In particular, we observe that the heterogeneity of the urban social movements (shadow groups) fosters learning and social innovation and gives them the flexibility that the front-loop's dominant groups lack to trigger change not only within but also across spatial scale (local community-based, neighborhood, city) and time dimensions, promoting a cross-scale process of revolt and stabilization, also known as Panarchy.
In the last decade, research on urban resilience has flourished. From the theoretical perspective, several authors have highlighted that, because cities are social-ecological adaptive complex systems managed by humans and organizations, ecological models analyzing urban ecosystems ought to include social interactions (Alberti et al. 2003; and Marzluff et al. 2008) . Consistent with this, other authors have modeled cities as heterogeneous, multi-scale social-ecological systems, with heavily intertwined spatial dimensions (Grimm et al. 2008; Pickett et al. 2004; and Ernston et al. 2010) . Interestingly, Bristow and Healey (2014) have emphasized that urban policies' success or failure in promoting sustainable development relies on the knowledge and preferences of the city's diverse composition of agents, entities, and networks; and Marcus and Colding (2014) have argued for the need to use the adaptive cycle theory as a tool of analysis of the urban systems. Most recently, Herrmann et al. (2016) have used the adaptive cycle theory and panarchy to compare the growth and collapse of cities, highlighting the complementarities of the two phases, as well as their time and spatial dimensions.
Despite these recent developments on urban resilience, urban studies have seldom used Holling's adaptive cycle theory to examine the dynamics and resilience of urban planning (Marcus and Colding 2014; and Schlappa and Neill 2013) . This is our main contribution. In particular, the novelty of our analysis is to focus on the urban policy domain, in addition to the more standard (for the literature) domains, namely the economic, social and ecological domains, when analyzing a city's adaptive cycle. In doing so, we merge urban policy with the adaptive cycle of the social-ecological complex systems (Holling, 1971) . To the best of our knowledge, our study complements work from: (1) Pelling and Manuel-Navarette (2011) who use the adaptive cycle to analyze the vulnerability of two coastal cities in Mexico to climate change; (2) Bures and Kanapaux (2011) who analyze Charleston's urban cycles of change to wars and climate change; and (3) Abel et al. (2006) who explore processes of release and reorganization in cattle and wildlife ranching in Zimbawe, and an Aboriginal hunter-gatherer system and a pastoral one in Australia.
II. Two Urban Eras
Using two urban eras from the city of Barcelona in Spain, we examine the cycle adaptive's Ω and α phases. During the urban planning era (from 1953 to 1979) , the massive development of public infrastructures replaced the citywide deficiencies in public facilities, green spaces, public transportation, and public libraries and schools.
During the urban (sustainable) design era (from 1980 to present), the aim towards the "urban common good" replaced an aggressive entrepreneurial urban regeneration based on public-private partnership. Appendix Tables A.1 to A.3 present evidence on the society, support, and nature sub-systems during the different phases of these two eras.
URBAN PLANNING ERA: 1953 to 1979
About two decades after the end of the Spanish civil war, the meager economic results from Franco's autarchy program begged for a drastic economic policy change.
Economic liberalization, substantial US economic aid, soaring tourism, and remittances from Spaniards working abroad paid for the country's industrialization and economic expansion. Not surprisingly, this is also a period of massive use of land and natural resources with the booming construction of rainwater reservoirs beginning in the 1950s and the building of nuclear plants (see support sub-system evidence in column 1, Appendix Table A .2). The country's industrialization concentrated in the old industrial areas of Barcelona and Bilbao, and the capital, Madrid.
The mid-1950s industrialization of Barcelona, a city in the northeast of Spain (41°-12´-41°-48´N and 1°-27´-2°-46´E), attracted an impressive inflow of rural immigrants from all over Spain (as documented in the "Social System" row, column 1, Appendix Table A.1), generating a huge housing deficit (Roca 2010). To stimulate new housing construction, the Spanish government liberalized housing policy by offering loans, subsidies, and fiscal exemptions to developers, transferring most of housing production to the private sector (Parreño and Díaz 2006) . At the same time, to address the unprecedented urban sprawl and densification, the government approved in 1953 the Barcelona District Plan (Plan Comarcal de Barcelona, BDP53 hereafter), whose objectives were to densify the existing urban fabric in the suburban areas of Gràcia, Sarrià, Sants or Sant Andreu, and replace the shantytowns that emerged in the early 1920s with housing superblocks (polígonos de viviendas) in the periphery of the city (Oyón 1998, and Busquets 2005) . As a result, Barcelona's housing stock tripled from 1950 to 1975 (as documented in the "Infrastructure" row, column 1, Appendix Table   A .2).
A loophole allowed municipalities to override the BDP53 plan with Partial Plans to the advantage of private developers well connected to the regime's power structure (Calavita and Ferrer 2000; and Herce 2013) . As a consequence, housing densities frequently ended up being higher than those originally specified in the plan, and many areas reserved for green spaces and public facilities ended up being developed for residential housing during the sixteen-year mandate (1957) (1958) (1959) (1960) (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) of Mayor Porcioles. According to Calavita and Ferrer (2000) , "about half of the land designated for public use under the BDP53 was used for speculative housing projects instead". Hugues (1993) explains that developments "designed without paved roads, playgrounds for the kids, or other signs or thought for infrastructure or public space, quite often made of poor materials that started falling apart within a few year" were often the norm. This period of aggressive urban sprawl was also a time of rising levels of car ownership and development of the highway system.
Urban Development and Urban Social Movements
Barcelona's urban planning practice led to functional and formal conflicts that brew its urban social movements (Busquets 1992, and Solá-Morales et al 1974) . A lack of green spaces and public facilities, difficult car access, and deficient lighting and sanitation conditions accompanied the heavy densification of the suburban developments. The health, social and wellbeing conditions in the housing superblocks and shantytowns were considerably worse as these settlements emerged in isolated areas in the periphery of the city with a priori poorly built densities, and their development was deficient in public facilities, green spaces, public transportation, and public libraries and schools.
Hence, the extreme densification of Barcelona mixed with the meager supply of public goods generated poor living conditions, social segregation, and deep social conflicts that brew urban social movements (Calavita and Ferrer 2000) .
Starting in the late 1960s, the neighborhood associations (comisiones de barrios) led Barcelona's urban social movements through different forms of protests, including rallies, marches, traffic interruptions, and signature collections. Even though Spain was still under Franco's dictatorship, and hence, lacked social liberties, the neighborhood protests coincided with clandestine activities of the unions and illegal political parties, the protests of university students and other objecting activities of professional associations against the political regime, contributing to a wider city-level protest movement (Vázquez Montalban, 1996) .
What caused the first creative destruction Ω phase?
The following events encouraged the decline of natural resources, and political, industrial and real estate capital:
 Natural Capital Collapse: The 1950s to 1970s urban development also caused an environmental crisis due to the rising demand of resources, and the massive emission of air, soil contamination, and water pollutants (shown in column 1, Appendix Table A. 3).
 The strength of Barcelona Urban Social Movements. By the early 1970s, the neighborhood associations were key players in both social and urban planning issues regarding the city, as well as opposing the totalitarian system. It is important to highlight that the neighborhood associations were not alone building social networks, and generating human and cultural capital (as shown in "Individual development" row, column 2, Appendix Table A.1).
 End of the Dictatorship in 1975. The fight against the dictatorship unified the urban social movements by giving them a common dissenting target. At the same time, the harshness of the dictatorship decreased as the society sensed that the Franco regime was arriving to its end (Castell 1983) . This weakening of the regime was apparent in many facets of life, such as the normalization of imported foreign books and journals, and the frequent and broad-scale social protests and objecting activities, among others. (Solans 1996) ."
What was the nature of the first creative destruction (Ω) phase?
Despite its breakthrough in urban planning, the 1974 revision to the BDP53 generated many complaints and objections from both the neighborhood associations and the private sector. The neighborhood associations disliked the proposed thoroughfares, which divided neighborhoods and affected thousands of homes, and the insufficient land for public use. The promoters and landowners feared profit losses and downward pressure in land prices, respectively. At the end, 32,000 allegations were presented, and the plan was revised thoroughly for two years, before its definitive publication in 1976.
These 32,000 allegations set the beginning of the creative destruction (Ω) phase, which was fueled by the urban social movements, led by the neighborhood associations.
Put it differently, the strength of the revolt of Barcelona's urban social movements (shadow networks using Olsson and co-authors' 2004 terminology) transformational agents of change who emerged in the neighborhoods and organized through the neighborhood associations; (2) urban development protest becoming a common platform for action against speculation; (3) a sincere attempt from political leaders to turn the protests of the urban social movements into effective proposals such as the Social Plans (Busquets 1979) ; (4) a larger than expected funds transfer from the Spanish government allowing the city to buy close to 221 hectares for public use (86 hectares for parks and gardens; 50 for woodland, 70 for school sites and other public facilities; and 15 for public housing) for 3 billion pesetas (Solans 1979 ); (5) broad-scope debates regarding Catalan culture, spanning from language to architecture, theater, and regional planning (Resolucions del Congrés de Cultura Catalana, Barcelona, 1978) . Although the BMMP triggered the creative destruction (Ω) phase, the preconditions for the reorganization (α) phase were in place when the shock came, and the system transformed into an early consolidation (K) phase, with social capital replacing the old regime's political capital, and young technocrats and architects developing and regulating the growth of the city. Despite the economic recession, which lasted from 1974 to 1985, the development of the much after thought public infrastructures soared in Barcelona, replacing the city's deficiencies in public facilities, green spaces, public transportation, and public libraries and schools, and reusing the unoccupied or abandoned (frequently industrial) spaces resulting from the industrial, economic and political crises. 
URBAN (SUSTAINABLE) DESIGN

EU Integration and Barcelona's Nomination to Host the Olympic Games: 1986-95
With the liberalization of the mortgage market in 1981, and the Spanish integration to the European Union (EU thereafter) in January 1986, Spain underwent radical economic changes, which improved economic confidence, boosted corporate investment and employment, and increased household incomes and demand. Barcelona led the country's economic expansion thanks to its 1986 nomination to host the 1992 Olympic Games, which boosted public regional and national investment to finance the city's large-scale public works projects (García and Claver 2003) and attracted much private investment to the city. With growth and consumption, the price of land escalated housing prices in certain though-after neighborhoods (as discussed in "Infrastructure" row, column 3, Appendix Table A .2) and resumed the gentrification process that had stalled during the economic recession. It was the beginning of a new economic growth model for Barcelona, based on construction, tourism and service sectors (Degen and García 2012) . The construction of new public spaces as well as the celebration of public festivals and cultural events in the different neighborhoods of Barcelona linked the segregated areas of the city and gathered residents from different neighborhood on common ground, enhancing social cohesion and citizen's involvement (as documented in "Social system" row, column 3, Appendix Table A. 1)
The Decline in Bottom-Up Participatory Democratic Governance
With the democratization of the Spanish political system, the political opposition dimed, and with it, the urban social movements in Barcelona progressively lost their potential and connectedness. Appendix Table A .4 describes six reasons for this loss. With their loss of potential and connectedness, the neighborhood associations and trade unions became less influential in Barcelona's governance.
At the same time, the strong influence of technical experts in the city's strategic planning combined with the loose or indirect public involvement in strategic, infrastructure, and metropolitan-region planning left little room for democratic control of changes in urban development, infrastructure and environment (Marshall 2000) . It is worth highlighting that the municipal regulation whose objective was to give voice to the neighborhood associations in the municipal meetings (ordenanza municipal de Calidad de Vida y de Participación Ciudadana) was never applied due to fears that it would slow down the implementation of the urban projects. Marshall (2000) also warns on the limitations of giving technical experts considerable influence across planning spatial ranges because they could easily be over-ruled by stronger personalities in other agencies or administrations, further restraining citizens' control on change.
As Marshall (2000) explains, Barcelona's governance model was "only consensual or collaborative because certain power elites were in effect deciding". Table A .2). Over that period, interest rates fell, the down-payment requirements loosened and credit standards tanked, making mortgages considerably more affordable and accessible. Long forgotten were the days when Barcelona's urban regeneration had as main objective reaching social cohesion, reducing income inequality, and addressing the growing city's welfare problems.
What caused the second creative destruction (Ω) phase?
The decline of the political capital, the impoverishment of public spaces and infrastructures, the weakening of the inclusive governance model, the loss of industrial and real-estate capital, and the loss of mass consumption resulted in creative destruction (Mascarell 2007; Miles 2008; and Borja 2010) . The criticism that economic considerations and developers' greed rather than citizens' needs were driving Barcelona's urban planning was becoming more and more common and was broadly shared by residents, local papers and academics (von Heeren, 2002; UTE, 2004; and Delgado, 2007) . Transformational agents within the shadow networks developed emergent community-based actions that were the basis for Barcelona's revolt and that generated a new era of adaptive renovation (also known as social innovation) with the beginning of the creative destruction (Ω) phase. These social networks resumed resilience and generated social capital in the spatial form of : (1) Crucially, Pla BUITS transferred rights to local communities so they could develop emergent actions in tactical urbanism at fifty different empty spaces across the city (Magrinyà 2015) .
All of these initiatives and actions converged and interacted, creating a common framework for articulating actions through social networks, and generating multi- 
IV. Barcelona's Adaptive Cycles
After analyzing two adaptive cycles of Barcelona's social-ecological system (from 1953 to 1979, and from 1980 to present), we observe that they both conform to the basic sequence of change in the adaptive cycle theory: a growth phase (r phase), followed by a consolidation phase (K phase), prior to a release (Ω) event, that leads to the reorganization phase (α phase). The novelty of our analysis has been to focus on the urban policy domain, in addition to the more standard (for the literature) domains, namely the economic, social and ecological domains. Below, we summarize the main analysis, illustrated in Figure 2 .
The Front-Loop
In the case of Barcelona's adaptive cycles, the growth phase (r phase) is long. Financial and natural (land) capital is plentiful, and fast-growing entities (private developers, politicians, or technocrats) take advantage of these resources to efficiently dominate the system. During the 1960s and 1970s, abundant financial capital from US economic aid, international investors, tourism, and remittances, added to economic liberalization set the grounds for Barcelona's massive urban sprawl and densification. In the 1980s and 1990s, the democratic-transition funds and newly acquired public-use land (first), and the mortgage liberalization, the EU and EMU entry, as well as Olympic-games and As the adaptive urban complex system matured, a few and homogeneous social groups or organizations (private developers and the bourgeoisie well connected to the dictatorial regime in the first era, and international and national private investors and municipality technocrats in the second era) came to dominate the system. During the conservation phase (K phase), resources (land, housing, green spaces, public infrastructure, and wealth) became scarce for "new" (and old) entities (such as youth, immigrants, the working and middle class, or the industry) and the system lost its flexibility as reflected by the rise in social justice, discontent and social conflict (hence, increasing the likelihood of the system collapsing).
The Back-Loop
As explained in the main text, disruptions in economic and governance domains encouraged the decline of capital. Indeed the 1973 economic crisis, the revision of the BDP53 in 1974, and the end of the dictatorship in 1975 encouraged the first change and reorganization (see bullet point 5 in Figure 2) . Similarly, the Great Recession and the burst of the real-estate bubble facilitated the release of capital in the second era (see bullet point 15 in Figure 2 ). Crucially, in both cases, the release phase (Ω phase) was triggered by a disturbance in the social domain as shadow groups (urban social 
IV. Conclusion and Panarchy
We have used the adaptive cycle theory to improve our understanding of cycles of urban change in the city of Barcelona. Most specifically, we have explored the vulnerabilities and windows of opportunity these cycles of change introduced in the release and reorganization phases. In the two recurring cycles of urban change analyzed (from 1953 to 1979, and from 1980 to present), we observe two complementary and confronted loops. During the front-loop, resources are efficiently exploited by homogenous dominant groups with the objective to promote capital accumulation based on private (or private-public partnership) investments. In contrast, the back-loop emerges from Barcelona's heterogeneous social groups (urban social movements and the third sector), whose objectives are diverse but converge in their discontent with the status-quo of the conservation (K) phase and their desire for a "common good" that includes social justice, social cohesion, participatory governance, and wellbeing for all.
The heterogeneity of the shadow groups fosters learning and innovation and gives them the flexibility that the front-loop's dominant groups lack to trigger change not only within but also across spatial scale (social networks, neighborhoods, city) and time dimensions, promoting a cross-scale process of revolt and stabilization, also known as
Panarchy. As such, the local neighborhood experiences in Can Batlló starting in 2011
or Vallcarca neighborhood starting in 2012 (Balanzó, 2015) , as well as the top-down municipal initiative, Pla BUITS, escalated to network bottom-up experiences such as "The Neighborhood We Want" plans, and became city-wide emergent and social innovations experiences. In 2015, Ada Colau, one of the multiple activists of the antieviction movement (shadow network) became the new elected mayor, creating a window of opportunity for change in Barcelona urban dynamics. 1950-1970 1970-1980 1981-1995 1996-2016 
Appendix
Society
Social system
Barcelona's population soared from 1,280,179 inhabitants in 1950 to 1,557,863 in 1960 1,557,863 in and 1,745,142 in 1970 1,557,863 in . Most of this growth-79% in the 1956 1,557,863 in -1960 1,557,863 in period, 90% in the 1961 1,557,863 in -1965 1,557,863 in period, and 57% in the 1966 1,557,863 in -1970 period-was driven by the arrival of rural immigrants (Ferrer and Nel.lo 1990) .
The construction of housing superblocks in isolated areas in the periphery of the city began in the 1950s and grew exponentially during the 1960s and early 1970s. Shantytowns in the outskirts of the city continued to multiply.
By the early 1970s, Barcelona had become one of the highest density cities in the world with 300 habitants per ha (Tatjer 2009) , and an area per habitat as low as 34.5 square meters, a third of the minimum recommended (Camarasa 1977 ).
Barcelona's population stagnated during the 1970s as a result of both a decrease in fertility and a drop in immigration (Ferrer and Nel.lo 1990 (Busquets 2005) , foster social cohesion, and a "sense of belonging to the city" (García-Ramon and Albet 2000) .
Social diversity replaced social and spatial segregation, urban identity was built around "Barcelonity", and the "discourse of class was replaced with one of municipal citizenship" (McNeill 2003) generating "a common democratic culture" in the city (Mascarell 2007) .
The gentrification process resumed.
International immigrants, grew to represent close to one fifth of the population by 2009 (up from less than 2% in 1996).
Aggressive entrepreneurial urban regeneration that disregarded citizens' needs and voices.
Gentrification in Old Town.
Over time, immigrants' low and irregular incomes prevented or excluded immigrants from accessing quality housing, segregating them in overcrowded sublet conditions in run-down parts of the inner city or the periphery of Barcelona (Pareja 2005; and Terrones 2007 While the bourgeoisie settled in the Eixample and around the Diagonal, the working class remained in Ciutat Vella, and the migrant workers were pushed to the peripheral neighborhoods.
The dispersion of land prices further pushed industries to the periphery of the city, and segregated social classes to different areas of the city (Ferrer and Nel.lo 1990) . percent in 2011, income inequality rose, and poverty escalated. In Barcelona, unemployment more than doubled within 5 years from 7.4% in 2006 to 16.9% in 2011 (Observatorio Barcelona 2013 .
Individual development
Starting in the late 1960s, the neighborhood associations (comisiones de barrios) led the urban social movements through different forms of protests.
Despite the lack of social liberties, the neighborhood protests coincided with other group's clandestine activities against the political regime, contributing to a wider protest movement at the city level.
The fight against the dictatorship unified the urban social movements by giving them a common dissenting target. 
Government
Totalitarian system.
Liberalization of housing policy.
The 1953 Barcelona District Plan (BDP53) aimed at densifying the Barcelona.
A loophole allowed municipalities to override the BDP53 plan with Partial Plans to the advantage of private developers well connected to the regime's power structure (Calavita and Ferrer 2000; and Herce 2013) .
Because of the massive opposition to the 1974 BMMP, the Spanish government replaced a benevolent mayor (Masó) with an intransigent one (Viola), well connected to the regime's power structure.
Franco died in November 1975.
The 1976 BMPP aimed at reducing the allowable densities from a potential of 9 to 4.5 million people, and reclaiming land for public use.
Viola was soon required to resign due to the constant neighborhood associations' complaints regarding real-estate speculation going on during the revisions of the BMMP. In December 1976, he was replaced by mayor Socias, who led the city through democratic
The municipality focused on broader and more ambitious projects, whose objective was to address the lack of facilities and services in Barcelona's periphery, and mitigate the social segregation and poor living conditions of the "Barcelona of Porcioles"
To implement education, health, and social services, Barcelona built a complex multi-level governance model, integrating the municipal government with other local administrations (regional and provincial) as well as social partners (business and trade unions) and NGOs, and financed with funds from regional, national and European institutions (Truño 2000 1950-1970 1970-1980 1981-1995 1996-2016 
Support Infrastructure
The share of the Spanish labor force working in the industrial sector grew from 23.5% in 1950 to 34.6% in 1970. Industrialization concentrated in the old industrial areas of Barcelona and Bilbao, and the capital, Madrid (Ferrer and Nel.lo 1990) .
The economic recession also brought the scarcity of capital for developers bringing the price of land down (Calavita and Ferrer 2000) . The concentration of services in Ciutat Vella, Eixample and the area of the Diagonal, added to Barcelona's radial public transportation system pushed up these areas' land prices and widened the dispersion in land prices across the different neighborhoods (Nel.lo 1987) . According to Lluch and Gaspar capital and considerably slowed down its private sectors' financial capital.
The political uncertainty that accompanied the transition to democracy and fears of socialism and expropriation of property also pushed land prices down.
resulting from the industrial, economic and political crises.
1986 nomination to host the 1992 Olympic Games boosted public regional and national investment to finance the city's large-scale public works projects and attracted much private investment to the city.
Housing prices soared. For instance, within a year (from 1987 to 1988), housing prices increased by 51% in l'Eixample and 100% in Diagonal and Pedralbes (Calavita and Ferrer 2000) .
In 1988, the Plan for Hotels laid the foundations for making Barcelona a tourist attraction and boosting its tourist industry.
Municipal intervention aiming at connecting and rebalancing the different areas of the city, and included the infrastructure of the 1992 Olympic Games. It also implied reorganizing the road network and defining nine areas of new centrality, plus the arrival of the Diagonal thoroughfare to the sea, the use of large-scale buildings as museums and cultural de Barcelona 2009 Barcelona's local government continued to pursue a growth model for Barcelona that sought international investment through making Barcelona a reference of "smart cities", on the one hand, and a tourism industry, on the other (Degen and García 2012 1950-1970 1970-1980 1981-1995 1996-2016 
Nature Resources
Massive use of land and natural resources with the booming construction of rainwater reservoirs beginning in the 1950s and the building of nuclear plants, result of the mid-1950s Spanish-US treaties.
Barcelona's natural capital downfall accelerated as domestic waste production increased by 32.5% in only three years (from 1985 to 1988) .
heat wave.
2007 energy black-out.
2008 water drough and the collapse of the sewage water system.
Environment
Environmental crisis due to the rising demand of resources, and the massive emission of air, soil contamination, and water pollutants.
The vulnerability of Barcelona's natural capital persisted up until the early 1990s.
Exponential growth of carbon emissions.
